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SUMMARIES 
This article consists of an English translation, 
with mathematical and philosophical notes, of three 
sections of the commentary by Albertus Magnus on 
Euclid's Elements: (1) the Prologue, (2) the question 
"Is an angle a quantity?" and (3) Book I, Proposition 
11. The critical apparatus which Bernhard Geyer pro- 
vided for (1) and (2) is also translated into English 
and updated by references to the new Cologne edition 
of Albert's Opera Omnia. 
Cette oeuvre contient une traduction en anglais, 
avec des notes mathgmatiques et philosophiques, de 
$rois parties du commentaire d'Albertus Magnus sur les 
Elgments d'Euclide: (1) le Prologue, (2) la question 
"Un angle est-ce une quantitg?" et (3) le Livre I, 
Proposition 11. On pr&ente aussi une traduction en 
anglais de l'apparatus criticus fourni par Bernhard 
Geyer pour (1) et (2), en y ajoutant les r&f&ences 
2 la nouvelle edition-Cologne des oeuvres completes 
dIAlbert. 
Dieser Artikel enthXt eine englische cbersetzung 
dreier Abschnitte aus Albertus Magnus Kommentar zu den 
Elementen des Euklid n;imlich (1) den Prolog, dann (2) 
die Frage, ob ein Winkel eine Quantitzt sei, und 
schliefilich (3) den elften Lehrsatz des Ersten Buches. 
Ein mathematischer und philosophischer Kommentar 
begleitet diese cbersetzung. Der Kritische Apparat, 
womit Bernhard Geyer (1) und (2) des Textes versehen 
hat, ist ebenfalls iibersetzt und mit Hinweisen auf die 
neue Kolner Ausgabe der Werke Alberts des GroBen 
ausgestaltet worden. 
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INTRODUCTION 
J. L. Heiberg's critical edition of the Greek text of 
Euclid's Elements of Geometry was published by Teubner between 
1883 and 1888. It was followed in 1908 by Heath's English 
translation, with introduction and commentary, which was pub- 
lished by the Cambridge University Press. Before the time of 
Heiberg, the commentary on the Elements by Albertus Magnus 
(1193-1280) had not yet been discovered, although the tradition 
that he had written one was noted in the historical and philo- 
sophical literature. 
In mathematics he commented on and explained Euclid. 
[Milman 1861, viii, 2651 
L'habile interprate des th8or3mes d'Euclide. 
[Haureau 1872-1880, ii, 1031 
In 1932, Bernhard Geyer of Bonn, Director of the Albertus 
Magnus Institute, examined a manuscript (MS 80/45) in the 
Dominican Library of Vienna, the second part of which contained 
a commentary on the first four books of Euclid's Elements. Its 
author was identified by the rubricator to be an Albert. The 
existence of this manuscript had been noted twenty-seven years 
earlier by M. Weiss [1905, n. 2601. Geyer afterward (1944) 
wrote a paper (not published until 1958) in which, having first 
shown that Albert had indeed written a commentary on the 
Elements, he argued that the Vienna manuscript contained that 
commentary and was even an autograph of Albert. His article 
ended with two excerpts from the manuscript, the "Pro8emium" 
and the question "Utrum angulus sit quantitas." E. Bessel-Hagen 
of Bonn undertook to prepare the manuscript for publication in 
the Cologne edition of the Opera Omnia of Albert, and after his 
death the work was entrusted to J. E. Hofmann of Berlin. 
Hofmann Cl9601 presented a report on the commentary to the 1958 
International Congress of Mathematicians but was unable to edit 
the text. The enterprise was then handed over to and completed 
by P. M. J. E. Tummers of Nijmegen, who prepared an article on 
his progress for the commemorative volume published in 1980 by 
the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto in 
honor of the 700th anniversary of the death of Albert. (This 
article is preceded by a more general one by G. A. Molland on 
"Mathematics in the Thought of Albertus Magnus.") All these 
developments were summarized in one sentence by J. Murdoch of 
Harvard University, whose article in the Dictionary of Scien- 
tific Biography may be consulted for the progress, since Heath, 
in the study of the reception of Euclid's Elements: 
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Indeed, there seems to be but one "original" commentary 
proper in Latin, questionably ascribed to the thir- 
teenth-century Dominican philosopher Albertus Magnus 
and, in any event, greatly dependent upon earlier 
translated material (notably the commentary of al- 
NayrizT). [Murdoch 1971, 448a] 
The present article contains an English translation, with 
mathematical and philosophical commentary, of those portions 
of Albert's manuscript published by Geyer and also of Book I, 
Proposition 11, the text of which is given in a footnote by 
Tummers. Geyer added 21 footnotes to the text of Albert, which 
he referred to as MS. A. For the most part, these are verifi- 
cations of passages and excerpts from other works of Albert 
which ought to be compared with statements made in the commen- 
tary. I have translated his notes, collected them before my 
Own, and updated them by including the reference to the new 
Cologne edition of Albert's works for each source he gives. 
I refer to these notes in the translation by lowercase letters. 
TRANSLATION 
1. PROLOGUE 
Just as philosophy, as Aristotle [l] says in the sixth book 
of his Metaphysics [a], is divided into three parts [2] (viz., 
physics [3], where the object of study is one whose form 141 
as well as whose matter is of interest; mathematics [S], which 
considers the form that is in movable matter [6] but is none- 
theless not conceived together with it by definition [b, 71; 
and a third part which deals with the divine separate things 
[81, which are neither in movable matter nor conceived together 
with it by definition), so the mind of man is capable of being 
perfected in three respects, one corresponding to each of these 
three branches of study. The first branch causes the mind to 
turn to sense perception, while the second equips it for deal- 
ing with mental images [9], but the third makes it divine and 
renders [lo] it somehow like an intelligence, in which process 
some part of the light of the intelligences, which are joined 
to the first principle [ll], is set flowing into it [12]. 
Ptolemy [cl, great in all divisions of learning, bears witness, 
however, that the first of these branches is unable to lead 
[d] man to a firm understanding of itself because of the mobil- 
ity and changeableness of its subject [13]. That this is so 
is clear from the differences of opinion among the natural 
philosophers, which even to this day cannot be brought into 
harmony [14]. What is more, the third part is so high above 
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us that, as the Prince of the Philosophers [15] himself says 
[e], our understanding is to it as the eyes of a bat are to the 
light of the sun [16]. The middle one, though, truly receives 
[f] the name of knowledge [g, 171, because it is both accessible 
to us and extracted [h], by definition, from the changeableness 
of sensible matter. Anyone who seeks to reach the truth of 
knowledge must therefore give it the greatest attention [18]. 
The Pythagoreans [19], we know, handed down that mathematics 
can be naturally divided in turn into two parts, namely, that 
which concerns discrete quantity and that which concerns con- 
tinuous quantity [20]. What is more, discrete mathematics is 
itself twofold, consisting of absolute discrete mathematics, 
which is the theory of numbers and their properties, and re- 
lated discrete mathematics, which, as it is applied to harmonies, 
music appropriated to itself [21]. Continuous mathematics is 
likewise divided into two parts, geometry, which deals with 
configurations or shapes of a continuum at rest, and astrology 
[221, which studies the configurations which are perceived in 
the distances, eclipses, conjunctions, and trine, square, and 
sextile aspects [23] of the mobile continuum, in so far as 
these configurations can be observed in the contemplation of 
motion taking place on one or more circles [24]. 
The study of geometry, therefore, comes after the treatment 
of arithmetic and music. The name itself means measurement of 
land [25], either because in Egypt 1261, where mathematics had 
its origins [i], the land and fields were divided up geometri- 
cally, or because man takes possession of land differently from 
other animals, for the human race, as Aristotle says [j], uses 
art and reasoning [27], wherefore whoever is a man refers every- 
thing he does to the standard of reason. Those who do other- 
wise [28] are no different from wild beasts except in the shape 
of their bodies. For this reason, Aristippus [k, 291, the 
Socratic philosopher, when he was shipwrecked on the shores of 
Rhodes and saw geometrical figures drawn in the port [301, 
cried out to the others, who were terrified lest the island be 
inhabited by savages, that there was a good chance that they 
would find friends there, because he had seen the signs of 
human beings in the port. And indeed, this turned out to be 
the case, for once the inhabitants had heard the philosopher, 
they honored, on his account, all who had been shipwrecked with 
him, and provided them munificently with clothes, ships, and 
money. 
Since now, as we have said, geometry is about immobile 
quantity, it is necessary to see what the principle [31] of 
this quantity is and what kinds of continuous quantity arise 
from this principle. As Alfarabius [32] says in his commentary 
on the theorems of Euclid, there are only three primary kinds 
[33] of continuous quantity [RI, line [34], surface, and solid. 
To see this, note that if we consider any straight motion what- 
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soever of a point (and this is its only simple [35] motion), we 
shall observe only length without breadth, that is, a line [36]. 
If, however, the point moves in a circle, it describes a perim- 
eter, which is a circular line. This is the case with the mov- 
ing leg of a compass. But this motion makes two forms, a convex 
and a concave, and therefore is not primary, so that the circu- 
lar line it produces is not primary either, whereas a straight 
line is, because there is only one kind of straight line. A 
point, then, by its primary motion, does not give rise to more 
than one kind of quantity. Now if a line moves, it will do so 
either in the manner of a point [37] or in the manner of a 
quantity with length [38]. If it moves in the first way, its 
motion will not differ from that of a point and will therefore 
describe nothing other than an extension of the line. If, 
however, it moves in the second way, into itself or into a part 
of itself, it necessarily describes a surface, which is the 
second kind of continuous quantity. If, furthermore, we con- 
sider a moving surface,, we see that it moves according to the 
form of a line [39], lengthwise, or in its own way, according 
to breadth [40]. If it moves in the first way, it extends it- 
self; if in the second way, it produces a solid, since it is 
necessary that breadth, by its motion, be formed into depth. 
We can proceed in this way no further, since it is impossible, 
as Aristotle proves in the frist book of On the Heavens, for a 
fourth dimension [41] to be added to a solid, no matter how it 
moves; the reason for this is that one cannot imagine more than 
three mutually perpendicular lines intersecting at a point [ml. 
Now if anyone should object and say that there are more 
than these three kinds of continuous quantity, namely, that 
locus, motion, and time, for example, are also such, let it 
suffice to refute him, for the moment, to say that there would 
be no locus without motion, and therefore, mathematically 
speaking, locus is a surface [42]. Moreover, motion would not 
be continuous were it not for the space over which it occurs, 
and time gets its continuity from motion, so both motion and 
time are continuous on account of space [43]. Moreover, a bit 
of motion [44] and an instant of time [45] are indivisible be- 
cause of the indivisible element of space, which is the point 
bl l For these reasons, locus, motion, and time are not true 
primary kinds of continuous quantity. 
It is also to be observed that continuous quantity is most 
closely connected with matter, and so we are justified in making 
the analogy that just as a potential ingredient is not actual- 
ized in one material substance and is in another [o, 461, as 
the simple is in the mixed, and the mixed in the combined, and 
the combined in the heterogeneous [p, 473, so is the line in 
the surface, and the surface and the line in the solid. From 
this it follows that the point is ultimately 1481 the principle 
of the continuous, and if compared to the line, it is the imme- 
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diate principle [49]. If the line is compared to the surface, 
the line is the immediate principle. The solid, however, is 
the principle of nothing [50]. The reason for all this is that 
every principle is simple and remains indivisible in the divi- 
sion of that whose principle it is. The point, therefore, be- 
cause it is in no way [51] divisible, is the ultimate principle 
of the continuous. The line is the principle according to that 
with respect to which it is indivisible, namely, according to 
breadth, and it has the point for its principle according to 
that with respect to which it is divisible, that is, according 
to length [52]. Corresponding statements can be made about the 
surface in comparison with the line and the solid. Moreover, 
just as we said that a surface, in turn, by its motion, neces- 
sarily generates a solid, even so, if this motion is of a par- 
ticular sort [53], the surface will produce regular kinds of 
solids, which are the only ones geometry deals with, for a sure 
account cannot be given of the irregular ones like the figures 
of animals [54]. If, for example, one angle of a triangle, 
which is a regular figure, is kept fixed while another [55] is 
raised little by little by the continuous motion of a rotation 
until the side they have in common is lifted directly above 
the fixed point, a pyramid will necessarily be produced, a 
solid which is the subject of many proofs in geometry [56]. If 
the figure of a circle is lifted by however much equally and 
continuously, it will produce a cylinder; if a concave surface 
is rotated, a sphere will be generated, about which zealous 
geometers have discovered wonders. Because, therefore, the 
principle of all these [whether immediately or ultimately] is 
the point, we shall begin with it as we take up the definitions, 
the principles, one could say, of the proofs. 
2. WHETHER OR NOT AN ANGLE IS A QUANTITY [57] 
Many are in doubt as to whether an angle [58] is a quantity 
[59] and, if it is, as to what kind of quantity it is [q]. For 
there are those who say that an angle is a relation, because 
it is called an application [60], and they give four reasons 
in support of their opinion [61]: 
(1) It is not a line, because it has breadth [62], nor a 
body, because it does not necessarily have depth [63], nor a 
surface, because it cannot be divided up in a way that a sur- 
face can be divided, for no angle is divided breadthwise, but 
only lengthwise [r, 641, as is proved below in Theorem 9 [651. 
(2) Every quantity remains a quantity when it is doubled 
[66], but a certain angle does not remain an angle when it is 
doubled, namely, a right angle [671. Therefore, this angle, 
when doubled, does not remain a quantity 1681. Therefore, an 
angle, by its very nature, does not seem to be a quanity [sl. 
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(3) No quantity is an accident [59] of another quantity. 
But an angle is an accident of another quantity; therefore it 
is not a quantity. For it is an accident of a surface or a 
body to be angular. 
(4) Nothing that is in itself a kind of quality is also a 
quantity. But an angle is a kind of quality. Therefore, it is 
not a quantity. For an angle, by its very nature, cuts a figure 
up, and this ability to divide is a kind of quality. 
We also find four reasons given in favor of the opposite 
point of view. 
(1) Whatever can be increased and decreased [70] is a quan- 
tity, but an angle can be increased and decreased. Therefore, 
it is a quantity. For an obtuse angle is greater than a right 
angle, and an acute angle is less [t]. 
(2) The subject of an attribute belongs to the same category 
as that of which the attribute is descriptive [71]. Acuteness 
and obtuseness [72] are conditions of quantity and conditions 
that describe an angle. Therefore an angle is a quantity. 
(3) That which divisiblity necessarily suits is a quantity. 
But that divisibility is suitable for an angle is shown below 
in Theorem 9 [73]. Therefore, an angle is a quantity, for an 
angle is divisible lengthwise. 
(4) Everything having dimension or dimensions is a quantity. 
But an angle has dimensions, length, and breadth. Therefore 
it is a quantity. 
It seems, then, that we must say that an ang.Ze is a quantity 
[74], but that angularity is a quality accidental to quantity 
[u, 751. For Sambelichyus, on account of the first reason 
given above [76], said that a "surface angle" [77] is midway 
between a line and a surface because it has breadth like a sur- 
face but cannot be divided breadthwise and has length like a 
line and can be divided lengthwise. Furthermore, a solid angle 
[78] is midway between a surface and a solid because it may be 
said to have depth but cannot be divided depthwise, only 
breadthwise and lengthwise. This he supports by referring to 
the great Apollonius [79], who defines an angle as a sort of 
intermediate quantity. He says that an angle is the contraction 
[80] of a surface or solid to one point; the contraction is en- 
closed by lines that intersect one another, though not directly 
1813, or by lines that come to an end on the surface [82]. He 
says "not directly" as Euclid also does, because if they inter- 
sected directly, they would not determine an angle, but a line 
instead. Even Aganyz seems to agree in this, when he says that 
an angle is a quantity having two or three dimensions whose ex- 
tremities come together at a point. Most felicitous, however, 
is the definition of Yrynus, who says that an angle is a quan- 
tity which a simpler, related quantity encloses when it comes 
to a point. For a surface angle is enclosed by lines, since 
it is midway between a quantity that has one dimension and 
. 
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another that has two, while it itself has two. A solid angle, 
though, terminates in surfaces 1833, being midway between a 
surface, which has two dimensions, and a solid, which has three. 
3. BOOK I, PROPOSITION 11 
Given a straight line, construct a line perpendicular to it 
at a given point on it (Fig. 1). Let AB be the given straight 
line and C the given point on it. Then use the second theorem 
[84] to mark off on AB equal distances on both sides of C [85]. 
Then construct, by Theorem 1 [863, an equilateral triangle on 
that part of the line containing C [87, 881. Or, if better, 
use the preceding theorem to divide the straight line into 
equal parts at C, and construct, by Theorem 1, an equilateral 
triangle on the two pieces of the line taken together [88]. 
Then divide [89] LADB [90] of the equilateral A ABD by means 
of Theorem 9 [91]. Draw line DC [92]. We shall now show that 
DC is the desired perpendicular. We have two triangles, A DCB 
and A DCA, with two sides of one equal to two sides of the 
other, for DB [93] = DA (the big triangle is equilateral) and 
DC is a common side. Also the angle LCDB contained between 
the equal sides is equal to the angle LCDA contained between 
the equal sides. Therefore, by Theorem 4 [94], the bases are 
equal [95], and the remaining angles are equal. Therefore 
LDCB = LDCA, and the straight line DC makes two equal angles 
LDCB and L DCA with the straight line AB. Thus, by the defin- 
ition of perpendicular, DC is a perpendicular, which is what 
we wanted to show. 
l 
A C B 
Figure X 
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GEYER'S NOTES 
a. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 6, Chapter 1 (1026 a 18-19). Cf. Albert, Meta- 
physics, Book 6, Tract 1, Chapter 2 (Borgnet ed. VI, 384 ff., Cologne ed. XVI/2 
(1964), pp. 303-305). 
b. The expression diffinitiva ratio is favoured by Albert. (Compare lot. cit. 
384-386.) It is the translation of Aristotle's 6plcnl~6s >6yos. (On the Soul, Book 
2, Chapter 2 (413 a 14), Metaphysics, Book 8, Chapter 3 (1043 b 31)). 
C. The Almagest of Ptolemy of Pelusium, at the press of Peter Liechtenstein of 
Cologne, Venice, 1515, First Book, Chapter 1: The two remaining parts of the theor- 
etical division are understood by conjecture alone, not grasped in terms of true 
knowledge. The theoretical part, indeed, is not grasped because it is never seen; 
however, the natural one is not grasped because of the motion of matter, the fickle- 
ness of its course, the speed at which it changes, and the brevity of time it endures. 
The agreement of the wise is therefore never expected in these matters. 
d. The first leaves of the manuscript (A) are 
some words are completely or partially illegible. 
damaged in this place, so that 
e. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 2, Chapter 1 (993 b g-10). Albert, Metaphysics, 
Book 2, Tract 1, Chapter 2 (Borgnet ed. VI, 117 b, Cologne ed. XVI/l (1960), p. 92, 
L.71). 
f. Optinebit has been conjectured for op. . . . . MS. A. 
4. Albert, Metaphysics, Book 1, Treatise 1, Chapter 1 (Borgnet ed. VI, 2 a, 
Cologne ed. XVI/l (1960), p. 2, fi. 31 sqq.): And therefore those qualities reached 
through the speculative intellect have acquired the name of science. On the Intellect 
and the Intelligible, Book 1, Tract 3, Chapter 2 (Borgnet ed. IX, 500 a, Cologne ed. 
VII (to appear)): Mathematics is very much the object of the intellect. 
h. Extracta has been conjectured for ext. . . . . MS. A. 
1. ' Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 1, Chapter 1 (981 b 23). Albert, Metaphysics, 
Book 1, Tract 1, Chapter 10 (Borgnet ed. VI, 20 a, Cologne ed. XVI/l (1960), p. 15, 
1.76). 
7. ' Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 1, Chapter 1 (980 b 27-28). Albert, Metaphysics, 
Book 1, Tract 1, Chapter 6 (Borgnet ed. VI, 13 a, Cologne ed. XVI/l (1960), p. 10, 
i'k 18-22). 
k. Vitruvius, On Architecture, Book 6, Chapter 1. 
b. Compare Albert, On the Heavens, Book 1, Tract 1, Chapter 2 (Borgnet ed. IV, 
4 a, Cologne ed. V/l (1971)) p. 3, u. 10-31). The solid, surface, and line have 
thus in turn been accepted as the species of the continuous.... But among these 
species of the continuous, the solid is more divisible than the others, because it 
is divided with respect to all dimensions as it has all dimensions. And, therefore, 
since it cannot be enlarged by another dimension, it is perfect among those things 
that have quantity.... Lines are either simple or composite. The simple ones are 
those like the straight line and the circle. But the straight line is simple both 
according to form and according to essence (essentiam), since on both sides it has 
only the form of the straight. The circle, however, is not absolutely simple because 
on one side it has the concave form and on the other the convex. 
m. Compare Albert, lot. cit., 4b (Cologne ed., ibid. &?. 65-67): The reason for 
this is mathematical, since it cannot be understood how more than three diameters can 
intersect one another at right angles. Compare Albert, On the Categories, Tract 3, 
Chapter 8 (Borgnet ed. I, 208 b, Cologne ed. I (to appear)). 
n. Compare Albert, Metaphysics, Book 5, Tract 3, Chapter 1 (Borgnet ed. VI. 
325 a, Cologne ed., XVI/l (1960), p. 257, u. 68-82): Other things are indeed called 
divisible quantities (quanta) because they are incidentally subject to division 
(quanto) in so far as they are related to division by the numbering in some way of 
the parts of that incidentally divisible quantity, and not by themselves, such as 
motion and time.... I do not say that motion itself which moves and is carried is 
a divisible quantity, but rather that it is a divisible quantity through that by 
which or in which there is motion, e.g., space. For by the same token that space 
is a divisible quantity, so also is motion. Time, further, is a divisible quantity 
in this, that it is an attribute of motion, according to which attribute (time), 
motion is a divisible quantity. [N. B. In the Cologne edition, read refertur for 
referuntur, and thus alter the translation given above (3rd line of note n) to read 
"subject to a divisible quantity (quanto), in so far as it is related...."] 
0. Compare On the Categories, Tract 3, Chapter 1 (Borgnet ed. I, 194 a, Cologne 
ed. I (to appear)): Since matter, as Avicenna says in his Sufficientia [Kitab al- 
COMMENTARY 
1. Albert (1193-1280) was the first of the Scholastics (i.e., Mediaeval School- 
men) to comment on all the known works of Aristotle (384 B.C.-322 B.C.) and to 
attempt to harmonize them with the teachings of the Church. His work and that of 
his student Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) did not at once meet with universal approba- 
tion; in fact, the novelties of Thomas were censured at Paris by the bishop, Stephen 
Tempier (1277), and at Oxford by Kilwardby (1277) and Peckham (1284), Archbishops of 
Canterbury [ijberweg-Geyer 1953, 4841. It would, no doubt, have proven impossible to 
adopt Aristotle at all, due to his denial of a creator-God and his silence on the 
fate of the individual soul, if the 13th century had not been an age that had come 
to look on philosophy as the "handmaiden of theology." 
In view of Albert's project to give Aristotle to the Latins, why, we may ask, 
did he choose to comment on mathematics, for Atistotle himself did not write a book 
on that subject. Indeed, the source of our Vienna MS. A was not an Aristotelian 
work, but the commentary of al-Nayrizi mentioned by Murdoch above. (See also [761 
below.) Albert himself has anticipated our question, and we may find the answer in 
the first paragraph of this prologue , particularly the last sentence. 
2. Aristotle divided philosophy into theoretical philosophy and practical phil- 
osophy. It was later much debated whether he viewed logic as a third constituent 
division or as the body of rules of method employed by the other two [Taylor 1912, 
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211. Theoretical philosophy he further divided into metaphysics, or first philosophy, 
natural philosophy, or second philosophy, and mathematics. His students considered 
practical philosophy to consist of ethics, economics, and politics. The Stoics (who, 
together with the Platonists, Aristotelians, and Epicureans, formed the four "here- 
sies" or possibilities of ancient philosophy) had also divided philosophy into three 
parts, namely, logic, physics, and ethics. 
Albert is elliptic here, for he knows very well that Aristotle is referring to 
theoretical philosophy alone when he makes the tripartite division. See Albert, 
Metaphysics, Book VI, Tract 1, Chapter 2 (Cologne ed. XVI/Z, p. 305, a. 25-28), as 
well as the translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book VI, Chapter 1, which Albert 
used. A discussion of this translation may be found in the introduction to the 
Cologne edition of Albert's Metaphysics (XVI/l: X-XIII). 
3. "The study of nature" would be a more exact translation of physica, since 
physics did not have in those days the special meaning it enjoys today. "Natural 
philosophy" is also a translation often used for the mediaeval physica. 
4. forma. The ideas ({b&al) of Plato were called by Aristotle pop@c and 
EE5Q. From ~.lop$ij comes the Latin forma or form. "Form" is conventionally used in 
translating mediaeval texts to indicate the influence of or adherence to Aristotelian 
philosophy as opposed to Platonism and its "ideas." 
5. Cf. Albert, In Evangelium Matthaei, II, 1 (Borgnet ed. XX, 61b, Cologne ed., 
XXI (to appear)): 
Mathematicus autem duplex est. Mathesis enim idem est quod scientia de 
separatis et abstractis, quae licet secundum esse suum naturale sint in 
rebus motui subjectis, tamen diffinitione abstracta considerantur, sicut 
est tota quadrivii scientia. 
Mathematician has two meanings. One has to do with the fact that mathesis 
is the same as the science of separated and abstracted aspects, which by 
their very nature are in things subject to motion; nevertheless they are 
by definition considered apart from those things, as is the whole science 
of the quadrivium. 
Mathematics comes from the Greek v&ies:a~s, learning. For abstracta, translated "ab- 
stracted," cf. Albert's Metaphysics, Book XII, Tract 1, Chapter 3 (Cologne ed. 
XVI/Z, p. 550, &. 47-52). 
6. Contrary to what Albert says here, Aristotle writes (Metaphysics 1076 32 
seqq.) that the objects of mathematics (e.g., numbers) are not "in" sensible things. 
It was Avicenna (980-1037), physician and philosopher, who said that the ideas are 
in the matter in which they appear or are exemplified. 
For Aristotle , mathematics arises because of the need for the measurement of 
motion. The type of existence enjoyed by the objects of mathematics was much dis- 
puted among the ancients, as was the type of existence enjoyed by the ideas. For 
Plato, the ideas were independent of the human intellect and were beyond exis- 
tence. Aristotle misunderstood Plato and thought he claimed that the ideas existed 
(as if there were somewhere an ideal horse), whence arose the interminable contro- 
versies between "nominalists" and "realists" [Cherniss 1944, passim]. The doctrine 
of Avicenna on this issue held particular authority during the Middle Ages. He 
taught that the ideas exist 
(1) ante res, "before the things," in the mind of God as Platonic exemplars 
according to which the things are made; (2) in rebus, "in the things" in 
which they appear or are exemplified; and (3) post res, "after the things," 
as abstract(ed) ideas in the human mind; but universals [ideas] do not 
exist in the natural world apart from individual things. [Durant 1950, 2551 
7. "By definition" is the meaning of the technical term ratio diffinitiva, 
which literally translates Aristotle's bp~a-r~lc?s x6yos. The ~~IUTIK~S is merely 
explicative. Since the teminology of Aristotle had made no impression on Latin, the 
Scholastic philosophers translated his phrases literally 
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so that many a strange-sounding Latin phrase in the writings of the School- 
men would be-very good Aristotelian Greek, if rendered word for word into 
that language. [Turner 1912, 550 b] 
8. Albert means, for example, the intelligences, who are mentioned by name in 
the next sentence. An intelligence is a being which performs in the natural order 
functions corresponding to those that an angel performs in the spiritual order. For 
example, the intelligences keep the planets in their orbits. In German one calls 
these beings Ferngeiste. They are the progeny of the divine intellect. See Albert, 
On the Heavens, Book 1, Tract 3, Chapter 9, and Book 2, Tract 3, Chapters 4 and 14 
(Cologne ed. V/l (1971), p. 74, u. 11-12; p. 149, L. 96-p. 150, 1. 3; and p. 174, 
k?. 67. 
9. Albert has imaginatio,whichis the Greek ~$clv~aafcl (Aristotle, De Anima, 432 
a 15 - 434 21), best rendered by the German Einbildungskraft; it is the ability of 
the mind to "see" the objects of mathematics just as the eyes see physical objects. 
10. The text has here, as frequently, the enclitic -que. Geyer points out 
[1958, 169-1701 that the use of -que is rare in the undisputed works of Albert but 
quite common in this commentary, and this he cites as the major argument from style 
against Albert's authorship of the manuscript. His observation that the mathematical 
nature of the work might account for a certain difference of style has no relevance 
to the frequent appearance of -que. In truth, Geyer works with the assumption that 
all is by Albert's hand [pp. 167-1691, but the Doctor Universalis must have had many 
disciples who were honoured to write up his utterances, This particular manuscript 
might have been written by some famulus or secretary who was a 'I-que person." What 
is more, with regard to Geyer's discussion of the unusual formation of some letters, 
to which he gives special attention because of his belief that the manuscript is an 
autograph of Albert, it cannot be ruled out, as he himself admits [p. 169, 3 ff], 
that a single person may write differently at different times, One just does not 
know for sure whether Albert is the author of the commentary, much less whether he 
personally wrote the manuscript. Paul Hossfeld has an as yet unpublished article 
in which he argues that Albert dictated the commentary to an amanuensis. 
11. God. The first principle is that to which all things can ultimately be 
traced. Principle is the Latin principium, the Greek &xfl, which translates as 
"beginning." Se also note [31] below. 
12. Cf. Psalm XXXVI, 10: In lumine tuo videbimus lumen (In your light we shall 
see the light) and the Nicene Creed: lumen de lumine (light from light). 
13. We have here a Platonic notion. This mingling of Platonic and Aristotelian 
thought is due to the fact that Albert's source at the moment is Ptolemy (fl. 2nd 
century A-D.), whose ideas on the certainty of knowledge are in some respects like 
those of Plato [Pedersen 1974, 281, while his primary source for his division of 
knowledge is Aristotle. It was the major accomplishment of Pomponatius (1462-1525) 
to present the unadulterated doctrine of Aristotle, just as Ficino (1433-1499) re- 
introduced pure Platonic thought to Europe. However, Pomponatius was not so inde- 
pendent in his interpretation of Aristotle that he did not owe some debt to the 
Scholastics. See [Mahoney 1980, passim; Pine 1975, passim]. 
14. William James (1842-1910) says the same thing as did Ptolemy about theology 
and theologians. Theology cannot be called a science, he argues, because there are 
so many diverse opinions among the theologians, each doing what he must to salvage 
his assumptions [James 1902, especially Lecture 18, "Philosophy"]. 
15. The prince is Aristotle, whom Dante (1265-1321) called il maestro di color 
the sanno, the teacher of them that know (Inferno, IV, 131). He was considered the 
philosopher par excellence, so that although Proclus (410-485) "considered himself 
to be simply a Platonist" [Kullmann 1950, 1411, his theology was later called Aris- 
totelian, perhaps because it was so learned [Dodds 1933, xxix-xxx]. Avicenna re- 
ferred to Aristotle as "the Philosopher," and so he was called for the remainder of 
the Middle Ages. 
16. In the story of the cave in the seventh book of Plato's Republic (514a- 
517c), the sun in the visible world is likened to the idea of the good; light is 
compared to truth (508E). See note [12] above. 
17. Scientia is the Latin word for knowledge. It should not be understood here 
in the special restricted sense in which it is used today. It translates the Greek 
&lluTi~rl, which was the Platonic technical term for the state of mind of those who 
meditate on the ideas. According to Plato, the mental state of those who concern 
themselves with the sensible, material objects of nature was the inferior 
Latin opinio, opinion, for which see the "differences of opinion" above. 
ddca, the 
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18. Pius II (Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, 1406-1464) wrote of man being able, by 
assiduous.study, to arrive at the pearl of knowledge (adipisci valet scientiae 
margaritam) in his bull for the establishment of the University of Basel. 
19. For the Pythagoreans, see [Diels 1903; Frank 1923; Heath 1908, Excursus I; 
Taylor 19281. 
20. The division of mathematics into the realms of the discrete and the contin- 
uous can be traced back to Bolthius (Arithmetica I, 1). Tradition, though, traces 
the distinction back to the Pythagoreans or even to Pythagoras himself. See [Smith 
1923, II, 261 and the references cited by Tummers [1980, note 271. 
21. The existence of incommensurables was known to the ancients. Even today, 
though, when we speak of "Number Theory," we usually mean the study of positive 
whole numbers. For the observations of Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. 1151) on these 
matters, see [Baur 1903, 111, l-41 and its English translation in [Grant 1974, 721. 
22. Astronomy and astrology were distinct sciences in the Middle Ages. 
Astrologia was often reserved for the more mathematical of the two. Astronomia was 
either the generic term for the whole study of the heavens or the term for that 
study which investigates the influence of the heavenly bodies in terrestrial affairs. 
For Albert's definition of astrologia, cf. Metaphysics, Book III, Tract 2, Chapter 3 
(Cologne ed. XVI/l, p. 117, &!. 40-44). For Albert on astronomia, cf. In Post. Anal., 
Book I, Tract 1, Chapter 3 (Borgnet ed. II 8 a, Cologne ed. to appear), and De Fate, 
a 4 (Cologne ed. XVII/l, p. 73, &!. 36-44). 
23. Two heavenly bodies are in the trine, square, or sextile aspect if they are 
one-third (1200), one-fourth (go'), or one-sixth (60°) part of the zodiac distant 
from each other, respectively. 
24. Given the earlier reference to Ptolemy, it is quite likely that Albert has 
in mind here his epicycles, whereby all motions in the heavens were explained in 
terms of the compounding of uniform circular motions. 
The Pythagorean division of mathematics into arithmetic, music, geometry, and 
astrology or astronomy was known as the quadrivium (a phrase coined by Bosthius 
(475-524)), in contradistinction to the trivium of logic, rhetoric, and grammar. 
In Albert's time, some of these subjects encompassed more than we might expect from 
their names; e.g., geometry included geography, rhetoric included law, and grammar 
included literature. This division of the most important subject matter into the 
"seven liberal arts" goes back to the Institutiones Divinarum et Saecularium Lit- 
terarum of Cassiodorus (c. 490-583), who borrowed it from the De Nuptiis of Martinus 
Capella (5th century A-D.), whence come the figures of the seven liberal arts that 
can be discovered on the fa?ades of mediaeval cathedrals (e.g., Chartres, west portal). 
25. yfi = Earth, )~s~pc?v * to measure. 
26. The Platonists had a special predilection for Egypt, whence geometry arose, 
as Herodotus (484?-425) says, because of the Nile: 
Sesostris . . . made a division of the soil of Egypt among the inhabitants.... 
If the river carried away any portion of a man's lot, . . . the king sent 
persons to examine and determine by measurement the exact content of the 
loss.... From this practice, I think, geometry first came to be known in 
W?Pt I whence it passed into Greece. (II, 109) 
27. This is his definition of man (Metaphysics 980 b 27). 
28. The rabble, barbarians, savages. 
29. This story of Aristippus (435?-356?) comes from the De Architectura I, 6, 1, 
of Vitruvius (fl. 1st century B.C.). The philosopher's life by Diogenes Laertius 
(fl. 2nd century A.D.) contains, as do all the biographies by that author, many anec- 
dotes in addition to this one which, if not true, are, as the Italians say, good 
stories. 
30. Teachers and students would draw mathematical diagrams in the sand with 
sticks, since paper and pencil were unknown. Archimedes (287?-212) was doing this 
when he was slain by the Roman soldier, who was provoked by his rebuke, Noli tangere 
circulos meos! (Keep off my cirlces!) See [Plutarch, Marcellus, XIX]. 
31. According to Aristotle (Metaphysics IV, 1 (1013 a 15) ), the principium 
is that in virtue of which something exists or is done or known. By the principium 
of continuous quantity, Albert means not the number line, which we accept as reveal- 
ing the essence of continuity, but the point, because he takes the line to be gener- 
ated by the movement of a point. 
32. For the life and works of Mohammed Abu Nasr of Farab (880-950), see [Mahdi 
19711. The passage Albert refers to cannot, according to Tummers [1980, 4921, be 
located in any of the works of Alfarabius that have survived. 
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33. tres species primae. 
For Aristotle, there is a distinction between two kinds of geometrical ob- 
jects: on the one side the line, surface, and body together with their 
principle, the point; on the other side the geometrical figures [such] 
as the circle and square. The first ones are the base, "the underlying 
matter" of the second ones, and the nature of the first ones is "quantitas," 
extentionality in one, two, and three [dimensions], as Aristotle says in 
the Metaphysics (VI 1 1061). [Tumxners, to appear, I, 11 
34. Albert has linea, but linea is more general than our straight line, which 
in Latin is linea recta. A circle or conchoid is also a linea. There does not seem 
to be any one modern term which can take on all the meanings of the Latin linea. 
35. simplex secundum formam. Simplex is the quality by virtue of which a sub- 
stance has neither constitutive nor quantitative parts. Albert means here that one 
cannot, with respect to any criterion, distinguish between the lines this sort of 
motion generates. One can, though, when a curved line is generated, distinguish two 
types of circular arcs, concave up and concave down. 
36. Euclid's (fl. ca. 300 B.C.) definition of a line is "breadthless length." 
The ancients recognized the necessity for postulates and axioms, but not for unde- 
fined terms. 
37. That is, it will merely describe a line, something a moving point can do. 
This happens when a line moves along itself or when a circular arc is rotated along 
itself. 
38. That is, it will make use of its one dimension, as when a line sweeps out 
a plane, or when a circle sweeps out a cylinder or a sphere. 
39. That is, it will simply extend itself, as when a hemisphere is revolved 
about a diameter of its base and produces a sphere, something a moving arc can do. 
40. That is, it will make use of its second dimension, as when a square is 
moved so as to sweep out a cube. 
41. Cayley (1821-1895) and Grassmann (1809-1877) were the first to introduce the 
fourth dimension into geometry (in 1843 and 1844, respectively). 
42. Locus (~6?ros) means place, which Aristotle defines as the boundary or inner 
surface of the containing body at which it is in contact with the contained body; cf. 
Physics IV, 4 (212 a 5-6). The objection might be raised that place ought also to be 
considered a continuous quantity, for it had been defined by some as the extension 
between the bounding surfaces of a containing body; cf. ibid. (212 b 6-9, 13-29) for 
Aristotle's refutations. 
43. esse motus et temporis continuum est a spatio. 
44. momentum. 
45. "An instant of time" is the translation of nunc, Aristotle's v&, the "now" 
(Physics 219a-2201 et passim). 
46. So we might say that although all lumber has the potential (possibility) of 
being made into chairs, only some of it actually is so formed, and in that of it that 
has been fashioned into tables, there remains the potential for making chairs. For 
the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential and the actual, see [Taylor 1912, 47-491. 
The terminology is more suited to biology than to mathematics. 
47. Mixed (mixturn), combined (complexionatum), and heterogeneous (eterogenium) 
are technical terms for progressively impurer substances. 
48. simpliciter. See note [351. The idea is that since the motion of the 
point produces the line, the point is the principle of the line, but it is ultimately, 
though not immediately, the principle of the surface too, because by its motion it 
produces the line whose motion produces the surface. By the same reasoning, the 
point is ultimately the principle of the solid also. It is therefore the principle, 
either immediately (of the line) or ultimately (of the surface and solid), of the 
three principle kinds of continuous quantity. 
49. Literally, the line is "principled" (principiatum) by the point. 
50. It is always a derived quantity because there is, according to Albert, no 
fourth dimension into which it can be moved to produce something whose principle it 
might be. 
51. simpliciter. 
52. The line is therefore not simpliciter indivisible, because it can be divided, 
though only lengthwise, not breadthwise. 
53. si secundum speciem accipiatur. 
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54. Albert calls lines, surfaces, and solids that can be defined mathematically 
(e.g., circle, sphere, pyramid) regular. The solid determined, however, by a cow's 
body cannot be so defined, and Albert calls such a figure irregular. 
Many of the geometers' figures are in no way found in natural bodies, and 
many natural figures, and particularly those of animals and plants, are not 
determinable by the art of geometry. (Albert, Physica, Book III, Tract 2, 
Chapter 17, Borgnet ed. III 235 b, Cologne ed. IV (to appear), translated 
in [Molland 19801.) 
55. We should say that the vertex is what is kept fixed or what is moved. LCAB 
(or L CBA) is the fixed angle, while L ACB is the moved angle. AB is the axis of ro- 
tation. (See Fig. 2.) 
56. Rotate AABC around AB until C reaches a point C' so that the plane of AABC' 
is perpendicular to the plane of &lBC. The pyramid Albert is talking about has 
vertices A, B, C, and C'. 
57. See [Turners, to appear] for many valuable notes and texts relevant to this 
section. 
58. The ancients had a very general notion of angle. If AB and CB were any two 
curves (not necessarily plane curves) intersecting at B, it was agreed that they 
formed an angle there (Fig. 3). What is more, if a solid "came to a point" some- 
where, e.g., as a cone does at its apex, it was said to determine an "angle with 
depth" or "solid angle" there. Albert quotes below the remarks of Simplicius about 
solid angles, but in the Metaphysics he takes no notice of them. (See note r.) 
Figure 3 
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59. The categories (KaTnyopfa1, Latin: praedicamenta) of Aristotle, whereby 
the ancients attempted to explain in how many senses the copula is used when we say 
x is (a) y, are: 
Greek Latin English 
I. OGUfCX (being) substantia substance 
II. Oh,, (how much?) quantum quantity 
III. ITOTOV (how?) quale quality 
IV. apbs TI (in what way?) relatio relation 
V. 
% 







VIII. 'EXEIV (to have) habitus possession 
IX. 7rOlEY" (to do) actus activity 
X. Tr&UXE IV (to have done 
to one) 
passio passivity 
Concepts belonging to categories II-X are called accidents (uuuBEB~~K~T~) or things 
capable of being said about or predicated of (accidunt, conveniunt) concepts in I. 
There was much debate among philosophers as to the particular category 
(according to the Aristotelian scheme) in which an angle should be placed; 
is it namely a quantum (~006~)~ quale (aotbv), or relation (7~~6s 'II)? 
[Heath 1908, I, 1771 
This very great controversy was due to the fact that no definition of the angle can 
be found in the extant works of Aristotle. Mathematical examples of quality are 
straightness and curvature; examples of relation are similarity, equality, and con- 
gruence. 
60. To apply (Euclid's 1~apa86XX~1v) a line AB to a line CD is to place A on C 
(Fig. 4). The application is indirect if B does not lie on CD or its extension; if 
it does so lie, the application is called direct. The conic sections take their 
names from the terminology of application, but the application in that case is one 
of rectangles to lines rather than of lines to lines as here. See [Heath 1908, I, 
343-3451. 
A B 
D A,C D A,C B D 
Figure 4 
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61. We observe here the standard method of the Scholastic doctors, who introduce 
all noteworthy arguments for or against a proposition, the latter being stated first. 
The method originated with the Sic et Non (Yes and No) of Abelard (1079-1142), written 
about 1120. 
62. The arrow BD indicates the direction of increasing "length" of LABC. The 
arrow on the arc EF indicates the direction of increasing "breadth." BD divides the 
angle into two angles, but EF does not. (See Fig. 5.) 
63. Only in some instances, such as at a vertex of a solid (for example, a cone, 
cube, or pyramid), does one have an "angle with depth." 
64. See the example in note 1621. In Geyer's note r, "indivisible" refers to 
the point at which the two lines intersect. 
65. Any rectilineal angle (an angle formed by two intersecting straight lines) 
can be bisected [Heath 1908, I, 2641. 
66. To double a quantity is to produce the same sort of quantity with twice the 
measure appropriate to it. To double a line, then, is to extend it to a line with 
twice the length of the original, whereas to double a cube is to produce a new cube 
with twice the volume. (To do this with straightedge and compass alone was the Delian 
Problem, one of the three classic problems of the Greeks.) 
67. Euclid's definition of the angle excluded the "straight angle." 
68. But it then becomes two lines or two quantities: what it does not remain is 
a quantity of the same kind, if one does not allow straight angles. 
69. accidit. For A to be an accident of B means that A can be predicated of B; 
e.g., obtuseness is an accident of an angle, but a point is not an accident of a line. 
An accident is that which cannot exist and which cannot be conceived of except as de- 
pendent upon some presupposed being. 
70. cui accidit esse maius et minus. 
71. cui convenit passio, convenit et subiectum. 
72. acuitas (sharpness) et hebetudo (dullness). 
73. See note [65]. 
74. Because of the last four reasons given. 
75. Because of the first four reasons given. Avicenna had reached a similar 
conclusion. See [Tummers, to appear, III, 11. At the end of Geyer's note u, we 
see that Albert uses "Ockham's Razor" a half-century before the Venerabilis Inceptor. 
76. That is, an angle is not a line, solid, or surface, because it has breadth 
but not depth and cannot be divided according to breadth. 
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Sambelichyus, Aganyz, and Yrynus are Latin transliterations of Arabic translit- 
erations of the Greek names which we know as Simplicius (fl. 500 A.D.), Aganis 
(evidently a contemporary of Simplicius, see [Tummers, to appear, note 39]), and 
Heron (fl. 3rd century A.D.). We are reminded of the observation of Renan [1852, 
521 that the Mediaeval edition of the commentaries of AverroEs (1126-1198) was a 
"Latin translation of a Hebrew translation of a commentary made upon an Arabic trans- 
lation of a Syriac translation of a Greek text." Albert made full use of a Latin 
translation by Gerard of Crempna (12th century) of the commentary on Euclid's Ele- 
ments by the Persian Abu' l- AbbRs Al-Fad1 ibn HBtim Al-Nayrizi, whom he calls 
Anaritius (d. ca. 922). For more on these mathematicians, consult [Heath 19081 and 
the Dictionary of Scientific Biography. 
77. An angle determined by the intersection of any arcs. 
78. For "angles with depth," see note [58]. 
79. Apollonius of Perga (262-190 B.C.), author of the Conic Sections. 
80. ouvaywyii, which in Latin is coniunctio. 
81. See notes [60] and [67]. 
82. As, for example, the generators of a cone come to an end at the apex. 
83. The solid angle at the apex of a cone is enclosed by the surface of the 
cone and may be said to terminate there. 
84. To place at a given point (as an extremity) a straight line equal to a 
given straight line [Heath 1908, I, 2441. 
85. Let A' and B' be the points taken on opposite sides of C such that A'C = 
CB'. Albert, without explicitly saying so, renames A' and B' as A and B, respec- 
tively, and makes no further reference to the original points A and B (see Fig . 6). 
86. On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle [Heath 
1908, I, 2411. 
87. That is, on the segment which I call A'B'. 
88 . . . 88. vel si maius, . . . . deinde super utramque partem simul equilaterum 
triangulum per primum theorema statue. "Better" is for maius, which means "greater," 
but maius is neuter, and the only neuter noun thus far is theorema, which it cannot 
modify. Is it possible that we have here a mistake for melius? Tummers thinks that 
this difficult clause is a bit of practical advice for those having trouble drawing 
the figure. As regards maius, he suggests: 
maius could refer to "the whole thing." It is also possible that maius 
refers to "line," because one often sees that a feminine as well as a 
neuter refers to line (linea or latus being omitted). [private communication] 
The "preceding theorem" is Theorem 10: To bisect a given finite straight line [Heath 
1908, I, 2671. 
89. Albert means "bisect." 
90. D must be the third vertex (after A and B) of the equilateral triangle that 
has been constructed. 
91. See note 1651. 
92. Albert assumes without proof that the bisector of LADB meets AB at C. This 
is true, but what he should have done is denote by C' the point where the bisector 
meets AB and then, after proving triangles DC'B and DC'A congruent, observe that 
77 AC = C B so C' = C. Albert does not use the fact that C bisects A3 in the following 
nroof that ADCB and ADCA are congruent. 
93. The manuscript has, by mistake, DC instead of DB. 
94. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides, respectively, and 
have the angles contained by the equal straight lines equal, they will also have the 
base equal to the base, the triangle will be equal to the triangle, and the remaining 
angles will be equal to the remaining angles, respectively, namely, those which the 
equal sides subtend [Heath 1908, I, 247-2501. 
A A' C B' B 
Figure 6 
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95. By assuming that the bisector of LdDB meets AB at C, Albert already had 
established that the bases were equal. (See note 1921.) Can the confusion indicated 
by this statement be explained by supposing that whoever wrote this manuscript did 
not accurately recall the utterances of the master regarding this proposition, or 
must we suspect that the Christian Aristotle was no more sophisticated in matters 
mathematical than his pagan mentor? 
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